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Abstract Automated guided vehicles (AGVs) are being
extensively used for intelligent transportation and distribu-
tion of materials in warehouses and autoproduction lines
due to their attributes of high efficiency and low costs.
Such vehicles travel along a predefined route to deliver
desired tasks without the supervision of an operator. Much
effort in this area has focused primarily on route optimisa-
tion and traffic management of these AGVs. However, the
health management of these vehicles and their optimal mis-
sion configuration have received little attention. To assure
their added value, taking a typical AGV transport system
as an example, the capability to evaluate reliability issues
in AGVs are investigated in this paper. Following a fail-
ure modes effects and criticality analysis (FMECA), the
reliability of the AGV system is analysed via fault tree anal-
ysis (FTA) and the vehicles mission reliability is evaluated
using the Petri net (PN) method. By performing the analysis,
the acceptability of failure of the mission can be analysed,
and hence the service capability and potential profit of the
AGV system can be reviewed and the mission altered where
performance is unacceptable. The PN method could easily
be extended to have the capability to deal with fleet AGV
mission reliability assessment.
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1 Introduction
For intelligent transportation and distribution of materials in
warehouses and/or manufacturing facilities, there has been
in recent years the increasing use of automated guided vehi-
cles (AGVs). Such vehicles travel along predefined routes
to deliver various tasks without the supervision of an on-
board operator. As the AGV systems are getting larger and
more complex, increasing the efficiency and lowering the
operation cost of the AGV system have naturally become
the first priorities, via investigating the design and control
aspects of the AGV [1–4], by identifying new flow-path
layouts including workstation layouts [5–7] and developing
advanced traffic management strategies, including vehicle
routing and task assignment [8–13]. Trenkle [14] introduced
the safety requirements and safety functions for a decen-
tralised controlled AGV system. Three major hazards, i.e.
collision with a person, tilting over and falling down, were
identified. The effects of the speed of AGVs, the braking
distance and detection area requirements as well as the mean
time to dangerous failure and performance were analysed.
Regarding failure response, Ebben developed a method for
failure control management for a special case study of
AGVs, an underground transportation system (with loaded
and unloaded AGVs considered) [15]. In the area of the
reliability modelling of AGVs, Fazlollahtabar [16] created
a model to maximise the reliability of AGVs and minimise
their repair cost, and Tavana and Fazlollahtabar modelled
the reliability of AGVs as a cost function to optimise time
and cost objectives [17]. However, fully understanding how
AGVs can fail and the causes of such failures is still needed.
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Some progress was made in this area by Duran et al.
[18] who attempted to identify the basic failure modes of
the light detection and ranging (LIDAR) system and the
camera-based computer vision system (CV) on AGVs by
using a combined approach of fault tree analysis (FTA) and
Bayesian belief networks (BN). In the work, human injury,
property damage and vehicle damage were defined as the
top events in the fault tree. However, the research did not
cover all components and subassemblies included in AGVs.
Modelling using Petri net (PN) has been becoming a
common tool and popular research topic to evaluate reliabil-
ity of a system or a mission. For example, Wu proposed an
extended object-oriented Petri net model to analyse the reli-
ability of a phased mission with common cause failures in
2015. [19] On the other hand, from the aspect of industrial
applications, Le and Andrews [20] presented a wind tur-
bine asset model to study the degradation, maintenance and
inspection processes of different wing tunnel components
based on PNs. However, to date the Petri net (PN) method
has only been used as a mathematical tool to investigate
route planning and control strategies for AGV systems. For
example, Luo and Ni [21] designed a programmable logi-
cal controller (PLC) using Petri nets to prevent collisions
of vehicles in an AGV system and Nishi and Maeno [22]
proposed an approach to optimise the routing planning for
AGVs in semiconductor fabrication bays.
However, to the best of the authors knowledge, PNs have
rarely been applied to the study of the reliability of AGVs.
In particular, their application to mission reliability. This is
the aim of the work presented in this paper. In contrast to
the combined approach of FTA and BN adopted in [18], the
combined use of FTA and PNs adopted here enables not
only the analysis of all failure modes of all the subsystems
but also an analysis of the mission of the AGV . In addition,
the PNs can be easily modified if the mission changed.
In a system with only a few AGVs, the failure of any one
of the AGVs will not cause a significant traffic congestion
issue. Moreover, the failed AGV can be quickly replaced
by back up ones. Hence, such a small scale AGV applica-
tion system can be easily managed [1]. However, given the
increasing number of large scale AGV application systems
where a significant number of AGVs share the limited num-
ber of travel routes, the failure of any one of these AGVs
will cause serious traffic chaos. Hence, for this reason, con-
sidering a complete investigation of the reliability issues of
all AGV components and subassemblies is important not
only to ensure the high reliability and availability of AGVs
and their success of delivering prescribed tasks but also to
optimise their maintenance strategies and minimise traffic
chaos. The reliability issues of the whole AGV system are
investigated through assessing the reliability of a typical
AGV transport system in this paper, where the capability to
consider mission analysis of AGVs is shown. The novelties
of this paper can be summarise as the following: an effective
reliability assessment of AGVs using combined FTA and
PNs has been proposed. Using the techniques developed,
the critical phases in the AGV mission can be identified and
their failure probability can be obtained. The PN simulation
is found to be an efficient and adaptable method to analyse
the reliability of complex AGV systems undertaking various
tasks.
The remaining part of the paper is organised as follows.
In Section 2, the reliability modelling methods are discussed
with the AGV application system being the focus of Section
3. Section 4 covers the AGV system reliability model gener-
ation and the AGV mission analysis is covered in Section 5.
The simulation method adopted and the results are presented
in Section 6 with the conclusions in the final section.
2 Reliability modelling
One of the most commonly used reliability methods, widely
adopted in industrial practise, is fault tree analysis (FTA).
This method allows a system failure mode to be expressed
in terms of the interactions of its components. Moreover,
with the aid of FTA, the probability of system or mission
failure can be computed via Boolean logic calculations. This
method has been adopted to evaluate the subsystem level
failures for the AGV system.
When the system is large and complex, or the mission
performed is made up of many phases, FTA can become
inaccurate and computationally expensive. In such cases,
alternative reliability modelling methods may be better
suited to performance analysis, one such technique being
Petri nets (PNs), developed by Petri [23]. Similar to FTA,
PNs provide an intuitive graphical representation of the sys-
tem being modelled allowing for reliability investigation.
The PN method is a direct bipartite graph which consists of
four types of symbol: circles, rectangles, arrows and tokens.
Circles represent the places, which are conditions or states
such as mission failure, phase failure or component failure;
rectangles represent the transitions, more abstractly actions
or events which cause the change of condition or state. It
should be mentioned that if the time for completing the tran-
sition is zero, the rectangle is filled in, otherwise it is hollow;
arrows represent arcs which are connections between places
and transitions. Arcs with a slash on and a number, n, next
to the slash represent a combination of n single arcs and the
arc is said to have a weight n. No slash always means that
the weight is one; and small filled in circles represent tokens
which carry the information in the PNs. The tokens move
via transitions as long as the enabling condition explained
below is satisfied, which gives the dynamic properties of the
PNs. The marking of a net at any particular time gives the
state of the system being modelled at that time.
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Figure 1 shows an example net where movement of
tokens have occurred after a time period, hence the tokens
make a transition through the net. The net has two input
places (represented by circles) and one output place (drawn
as a circle) connected by a timed transition (hollow rectan-
gle) with a time delay t. There is one token and three tokens
(represented by small filled in circles) in each of the two
input places. The input places have arcs with weights 1 and
2, respectively. Currently, there are no tokens in the output
place; however, a transition will be enabled when the num-
ber of tokens contained in every input place is equal to or
more than the corresponding arc weights. Given this is true
for the net shown in Fig. 1, the transition is enabled and the
number of tokens equivalent to the output arc number are
transferred to the output place; in this instance, one token
appears in the output place. The number of tokens moved
to the output place is dependent on the corresponding arc
weight, hence if the arc weight is ‘n’, then n more tokens
will appear in the output place after the transition fires.
Petri nets for system representations are built up using
these same components. Research has shown the applica-
tion of these nets to systems that undertake phased missions,
where a net is generated for the system and an additional
net is developed for the phase, known as a system and phase
net, respectively [24]. Extensions for more complex sys-
tems have included using three distinct PNs, i.e. phase PN,
component PN and master PN [25]. These three kinds of
PNs are linked together and interact with each other. Such
an extended approach is adopted in this paper to assess the
reliability of AGV systems.
3 Application AGV system and mission
A typical AGV transport system used in a warehouse for
material distribution is chosen for analysis in this research.
As shown in Fig. 2, the AGV system consists of various
subsystems, where the software control system is central to
the AGV’s operation. This subsystem is responsible for pro-
cessing and interpreting the information received from both
the laser navigation system and safety system, and sends
either motion or operation orders. Linked to this subsystem,
there are a number of inputs and outputs. The laser navigation
system and the safety system both feed into the control unit.
Fig. 1 Petri net model with transitions
Fig. 2 Typical AGV system
The laser navigation system, like that developed by
MacLeod [26], is in essence a position measurement system
that is responsible for locating the AGV. The safety system
is a collision/avoidance system designed to avoid obstacles
that could appear on the pathway with the aid of a laser
detection system installed on the AGV. In order to perform
its tasks, the AGV has a number of output systems: the drive
unit, the brake system, the steering system and the attach-
ments (for lifting, etc.). In terms of the motion or operation
orders, these are executed by the drive unit, the brake sys-
tem and/or the steering system. The drive unit is typically
a brushless DC electric motor which is responsible for pro-
viding power for the motion and operation of the AGV, the
braking system is responsible for slowing down or stopping
the AGV and is always applied when the AGV is station-
ary. The steering system is responsible for manoeuvring the
AGV. Attachments refer to additional components that are
used to assist moving and carrying of items. All functions
require a power system, which is typically lead–acid battery
which is responsible for supplying power to the whole AGV
system.
In terms of the mission of the AGV, this can be broken
up into distinct tasks. First of all, the AGV has to opti-
mise the routes for completing the whole mission, given
its assignment. Once in motion, the AGV will travel to the
material collection port along the optimised route to pick up
the materials. After the AGV is loaded with the materials, it
Table 1 Assumed phase lengths
Phase Phase length (h)
Mission allocation & route optimisation 0.02
Dispatch to station 0.20
Loading of item 0.02
Travelling to storage 0.15
Unloading 0.02
Travelling back to base 0.10
Int J Adv Manuf Technol
will travel to the destination and unload the materials. After
successfully distributing the materials, the AGV will travel
back to its original parking position. Therefore, the whole
mission can be divided into six phases in total, namely (1)
mission allocation and route optimisation, (2) dispatch to
station, (3) loading of item, (4) travelling to storage, (5)
unloading and (6) travelling back to base. The mission can
be regarded as successful only when the AGV is able to
operate successfully throughout all these six phases without
any break due to component and/or subsystem failures and
maintenance. Such a period is named as a maintenance-free
operational period (MFOP) [27].
In order to calculate the phase mission reliability, the
length of each phase (i.e. the time duration for completing
each phase) is required and the values assumed in this work
are shown in Table 1. These values taken are for demon-
stration purposes, where the total time duration to complete
the whole mission is 0.51 h. It is worth mentioning that the
assumed values in Table 1 are based on the consultation with
an AGV operator. These values would be different for different
applications. Therefore, the time duration should be modified
correspondingly when considering different AGV applications.
4 AGV reliability model generation
4.1 Subsystem level reliability models
Initially, a detailed FMECA analysis of the AGV (with an
extract illustrated in Table 2) was performed in order to
obtain a detailed understanding of the vehicle. Eight subsys-
tems were identified for analysis. In Table 2, the subsystem,
the laser navigation system (LNS), is shown where columns
labelled S, F, D and RPN refer to the severity ranking,
frequency ranking, detectability ranking (all with ratings
1–5) and risk priority number, respectively (calculated as
the multiplicity of all three rankings). Similar tables were
developed for all AGV subsystems.
The understanding gained from the FMECA was then used
to construct fault trees describing the failure of each subsystem.
As an example the failure of the laser navigation sys-
tem (LNS) is shown in Fig. 3. This subsystem failure can
be broken down to be caused by four basic events: laser
emitter failure; laser sensor failure; GPS failure and signal
transmitter failure. In total, eight subsystem level fault trees
have been constructed, varying in size from just 1 gate and 5
events to 3 gates and 11 events. Following this understand-
ing of the interrelationships between failures within the
AGV system, this information can be used to establish the
likelihood/frequency of AGV subsystem failure. A quanti-
tative analysis of the fault trees has yielded the frequency
of failure of each subsystem as shown in Table 3. The data
used for the basic events in the subsystem fault trees was
based on RAC FMD-97 [28] and expert knowledge.
4.2 Mission phase reliability models
Given the AGV undertakes a mission comprised of different
phases, the relationship between the subsystems that operate
within each phase needs to be understood. Failure models,
using fault tree analysis, of these phases within the mis-
sion have been developed in this paper and analysed. As
the subsystems within the AGV are independent, to reduce
the size of the phase fault trees, the tree branches are termi-
nated at the subsystem level, where they have been shown
as events. The quantified data and logic for these subsys-
tem events is taken from that derived from the subsystem
fault trees as described in the previous section. To illus-
trate the phase relationships, phase 1 and 6 are discussed in
detail. Phase 1 is for ‘mission allocation and route optimisation’,
where firstly the laser navigation system (LNS) needs to
correctly locate the AGV’s position. Then, all routes for
Table 2 Part FMECA of AGV system
Identity Function Sub-item Failure mode Failure effect System effect S F D RPN
Local effect
Laser navigation
system
Locate correct
position. Send
and receive the
information of
location
GPS Unit fails AGV Halt motion for
safety
Routing and dis-
patching inhib-
ited
3 3 4 36
Signal transmitter Unable to send
information of
location to the
central system
Halt motion for
safety
Routing and dis-
patching inhib-
ited
3 3 4 36
Laser emitter Unit fails Halt motion for
safety
Route block;
AGV confliction
3 3 4 36
Laser sensor Unit fails Halt motion for
safety
Task fails 2 3 4 24
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Laser Navigation 
System Failures
LNS Fails to 
obtain Accurate 
Location 
Signal 
Transmitter Fails
Laser Part 
fails
GPS Fails to Obtain 
Approximate Location
Laser Emitter 
Fails
Laser Sensor 
Fails
SensorEmitter
GPS
Trans
Fig. 3 Laser navigation subsystem level fault tree
completing the phase mission should be properly optimised
via the AGV software control system (ASCS). The phase
cannot be completed if either the LNS or ASCS fails to work
properly. In throughout the phase. The fault tree for phase 1
is shown in Fig. 4.
In Phase 6, the fault tree for which is shown in Fig. 5,
the AGV will travel from the storage back to the base. Dur-
ing this period, the ASCS will control the AGV to travel
along the optimised route, the LNS will locate the AGV
as it moves, the motor will drive the vehicle, the steering
Table 3 Calculated frequencies of the AGV subsystem failures
Subsystem Failure rate (frequency/year)
Drive unit 1.5
AGV software control system 6
Laser navigation system 0.875
Safety systems 0.375
Attachments 2
Battery 1.25
Brake system 0.2
Steering system 0.25
Conditions Met For 
Failure in Phase 1
AGV Input and 
Control Failures 
in Phase 1
Loss of Power 
Supply
LNS 
Failures
ASCS 
Failures
Control
Battery
LNS
Fails During 
Phase 1
Fig. 4 Fault tree failure model for phase 1
system will enable vehicle turning, the safety system will
perform an obstacle scan and the brake system will slow
down the vehicle when turning and stop the vehicle if nec-
essary to avoid collisions. Obviously, the success of phase
6 of the mission relies on the synchronous cooperation of
all these subassemblies. The failure of any one of them can
lead to the failure of the AGV during phase 6. In addition,
phase 6 can be started only after all of the previous phases
have been completed successfully. This is shown in Fig. 5
with the events from ‘Functions Through Phase 1’ to ‘Func-
tions Through Phase 5’ and ‘Conditions Met For Failure in
Phase 6’ joined under an ‘AND’ gate. The event ‘Functions
in phase 1’ is the event ‘Failure in Phase 1’ under a ‘NOT’
gate, likewise for phase 2 to phase 5. In general, the mis-
sion failure in phase j+1 is the combined result of successful
phases 1 to j and the system failure occurring in phase j+1
via an ‘AND’ gate and the ‘NOT’ gate is used to represent
system success during phases 1 to j. Similar fault tree mod-
els for the remaining four phases have been created. In these
models, all of the corresponding subsystems in each phase
are required to work properly and synchronously as well
and all previous phases must have been completed success-
fully. The later the phase in the mission the larger its fault
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Fails During 
Phase 6
Functions 
Through Phase 1
Functions 
Through Phase 2
Functions 
Through Phase 3
Functions 
Through Phase 4
Functions 
Through Phase 5
Failure in Phase 
1
Failure in Phase 
2
Failure in Phase 
3
Failure in Phase 
4
Failure in Phase 
5
Conditions Met 
For Failure in 
Phase 6
Mechanical Parts 
Failures in P6 
System Failure 
in P6
Loss of Power 
Supply
Drive Unit 
Failure
Brake 
Failure
Steering 
Failure
LNS
Failure
ASCS 
Failure
Safety System 
Failure
Motor SafetyControlLNSSteeringBrake
Battery
Fig. 5 Fault tree failure model for phase 6
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tree is, as the number of phases that must have been com-
pleted successfully increases. For example, the fault tree of
phase 6 requires the successful completions of all previous
five phases, this results in the tree containing 73 individ-
ual events and 44 gates. Using the fault trees developed, the
AGV operation can be both qualitatively and quantitatively
analysed at each phase.
The subsystem failures that lead to the different phase
failures are listed in Table 4 and the phase failure probabili-
ties obtained from analysing the fault trees are also shown in
the table. As an example of how these results were obtained,
consider phases 1 and 2. Due to the existence of NOT
gates in the phase fault trees for failure during any phase
after the first one, the fault trees are non-coherent. In this
case, the occurrence of the system failure in the phase can
be expressed using the prime implicants. The prime impli-
cants are the minimal combination of component states that
cause top event failure. For example, the prime implicants
for failures within phase 1 and phase 2, represented by T1
and T2, respectively, can be computed using the following
expressions:
T1 = Failure in P1
= ASCS1 + LNS1 + Battery1
(1)
T2 = (Failure in P2).(Success up to P2)
= (DC1,2 + Brake1,2 + Steering1,2
+ ASCS1,2 + LNS1,2 + SS1,2
+ Battery1,2).(ASCS1 + LNS1 + Battery1)
(2)
Table 4 Subsystem failures that cause the failure at each phase
Phase Subsystem failures causing phase
failure at each phase
Phase unreliability
1 ASCS; LNS; battery 0.00001855
2 Drive unit (DC); brake system;
steering system; ASCS; LNS;
safety system (SS); battery
0.00024386
3 Attachments; brake system;
ASCS; safety system; battery;
0.00007266
4 Drive unit; ASCS; LNS; safety
system; attachments; battery;
brake system; steering system
0.00021915
5 Attachments; brake system;
ASCS; safety system; battery;
0.00002243
6 Drive unit; ASCS; LNS; safety
system; battery; brake system;
steering system
0.00012527
where subscript 1 denotes failure in phase 1 and subscript
1,2 denotes failure in any phase from 1 to 2. Expressions
T1 and T2 are obtained from the fault trees for phases 1
and 2, respectively. As can be seen from Fig. 4 for T1. As
the number of components and phases increases the deriva-
tion of prime implicants also becomes more complex. Once
the prime implicants are known, the calculation of unreli-
ability in phase 1 and phase 2 can be conducted using the
inclusion-exclusion principle as shown in [25]. For exam-
ple, the probability of failure up to the end of phase 1, Q1,
can be calculated as
Q1 = Pr(ASCS1) + Pr(LNS1) + Pr(Battery1)
− Pr(ASCS1.Battery1)
− Pr(ASCS1.Battery1)
− Pr(LNS1.Battery1)
+ Pr(ASCS1.LNS1.Battery1)
= qASCS1 + qLNS1 + qBattery1
− qASCS1 .qLNS1
− qASCS1 .qBattery1
− qLNS1 .qBattery1
+ qASCS1 .qLNS1 .qBattery1
(3)
The probability of failure of basic event A in all phases
from i to j (i.e. qAi,j ) can be calculated using Eq. 4:
qAi,j = e−λAti−1 − e−λAtj (4)
where λA refers to the failure rate of a basic eventA, tj is the
length of phase j . The phase j (Pj ) unreliability or failure
probability can be determined using:
Pr(PjFailure) = 1 − Success up to end of Pj
Success up to end of Pj−1
= 1 − 1 − Q1,j
1 − Q1,j−1
(5)
where Q1,j refers to the unreliability in all phases from 1
to j . It should be noticed that the probability of failure is
calculated using the exponential distribution as it is assumed
that the AGV fails when the components are in their useful
life periods.
For more complex systems or missions especially involv-
ing dependencies of the components, the derivation of the
prime implicants for reliability calculation becomes increas-
ingly complex. Therefore, using FTA for mission analysis
requires extensive processing power, and therefore the PN
technique has been investigated.
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5 Mission level Petri net model generation
Petri net analysis has been adopted to investigate the reli-
ability of the mission, initially the Petri net model itself is
generated, which involves a three tiered approach with the
subsystem Petri nets (SPN) feeding into the phase Petri net
(PPN), which feeds the master mission Petri net (MPN).
5.1 Subsystem Petri net(SPN)
Given the modularity of the subsystems, this has been cho-
sen as the starting point for the lower tier of Petri net
models, referred to as the subsystem Petri net (SPN) model,
as shown in Fig. 6.
The subsystem labels 1–8 correspond to the subsystem
failure modes listed in Table 3. These PN models are used
to model the health states of each of the AGV subsystems.
For more complex architectures, this tier can have a preced-
ing tier represented by component models. As the mission
has been modelled as a MFOP, the repair of subsystems
will not be considered in this study. Therefore, the SPN will
show only two kinds of health state, i.e. ‘subsystem up’ and
‘subsystem down’. Once a subsystem fails after working for
a certain period of time, the token in the ‘subsystem up’
place will be transferred to the ‘subsystem down’ place. The
time for this failure transition can be computed by using
the random sampling and exponential distribution method,
using the component failure rate data from the subsystem
modelling given in Table 3 [29].
The information about subsystem failures can then be fed
into the phase Petri net (PPN) models, using linking-arcs,
which are the dashed lines in Fig. 6.
Fig. 6 Subsystem Petri net
Fig. 7 Phase Petri net for phase 1
5.2 Phase Petri net (PPN)
The PPN presents the interrelated subsystem failure mech-
anisms that correspond to failure in the phase. The logic
used for implementing FTA can be directly applied when
constructing the PPNs. For this reason, the PPN’s constru-
cted for phases 1 and 6, which relate to the fault trees in
Figs. 4 and 5, are shown in Figs. 7 and 8 to ease understand-
ing. The transitions are instantaneous and are represented by
solid rectangular bars. Comparing the fault tree for phase 6
in Fig. 5 and the corresponding PPN in Fig. 8, it can be seen
Fig. 8 Phase Petri net for phase 6
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that there is no place in the PN corresponding to the events
for functioning through the previous phases in the fault tree.
This is dealt with in the master Petri net described in the fol-
lowing section. Tokens are absent from all places in Figs. 7
and 8, illustrating that the whole AGV system is in a good
health condition. In other words, the presence of a token in a
place will mean the failure of either a subsystem or a phase.
5.3 Master Petri net (MPN)
The MPN is used to govern the change of phases from the
beginning of the mission, phase 1, to the successful comple-
tion of the whole mission, at the end of phase 6. Figure 9
shows the structure of the MPN, where a token in the phase
place is used to indicate the phase that the AGV is operating
in. The system failure happening in each phase, i.e. the top
event of the PPN for that phase, will directly result in the
failure of the whole mission. Hence, if the AGV is operating
in phase i so that a token resides in place ‘phase i’ and the
AGV fails in that phase, so a token is in place ‘Pi failure’
then a token will be transferred to the system failure place,
so that the mission fails. The switching time of transition
between two neighbouring phase places is the length of the
preceding phase. Likewise, the switching time of transition
between phase 6 and mission finish is the length of phase 6.
If the AGV completes all six phases without a phase failure,
then a token will be placed in the ‘simulation success’ place.
6 Simulation and results
6.1 Simulation model
In order to calculate results about how reliable the operation
of the AGV mission is, the PN model has been embedded
Start
Set ISIM=0 and total number 
of simulation = 1 billion
ISIM = ISIM + 1
Import data, generate 
switching time
Find the minimum 
switching time, switch it
Switch any enabled 
immediate transitions
Any more immediate 
transitions enabled?
System failure?
Mission finished
Begin next simulation
ISIM = 1 billion?
Stop
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Step 6
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
Step 5
Fig. 10 Simulation flowchart
in a simulation model. The failure rates of all AGV sub-
systems and the phase lengths are used as inputs of the
Fig. 9 Master Petri net
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PN simulation. Then, the simulation can be programmed by
using the following steps (as illustrated in Fig. 10):
Step 1: Import the phase lengths into the MPN and in
parallel, generate the switching time of the transitions
of each subsystem in the SPN’s by using the randomly
sampling and exponential distribution method;
Step 2: Find the transition with the minimum switching
time and then switch it;
Step 3: Search through the immediate transitions that are
directly connected to the present place. If any are found
enabled, switch them;
Step 4: Repeat Step 3 until no more immediate transitions
are enabled;
Step 5: Test for any of the following conditions and log
them: (a) if system has failed, begin next simulation; (b)
if mission has completed, begin next simulation.
Step 6: Iterate the above simulation for n times based on
the assumption that the reliability of the AGV system can
be obtained by repeating the simulation for a sufficient
number of times.
6.2 Results and validation
Embedding the PN into a simulation, the phase unreliabil-
ity and mission reliability have been calculated. The results
obtained are shown in Table 5 (columns 1–5). In order to
ensure a good convergence of the computing result, one bil-
lion simulations have been performed in the process of this
calculation. The results have been validated by using the
FTA method to calculate the phase and mission reliability
(results shown in columns 6 and 7 of Table 5). The com-
parison shows that the simulation results obtained from the
PN method are very close to the analytical solutions derived
from FTA. The simulation errors of both the unreliability
Fig. 11 Convergence of phase 1 unreliability
of each phase and the mission reliability at the end of each
phase are below 1%.
Considering the convergence of the results, Fig. 11 shows
the comparison of the analytical and simulated solution for
phase 1 as the number of simulations increases. As can be
seen in the figure the value of the unreliability of phase
1 obtained from the simulation has converged to the ana-
lytical result after performing approximately 100 million
simulations. Similar results were found for the other phases.
Hence, performing 1 billion simulations is sufficient to
guarantee the reliability of the calculated result.
From the results presented in Table 5, it is found that
phase 2 ‘dispatch to station’ and phase 4 ‘travelling to stor-
age’ show the largest phase unreliability values. This means
that the AGV is more likely to fail when it is undertaking the
tasks of these two phases. Additionally, it is found that the
mission reliability at the end of the sixth phase is 0.999297,
which is based on the success of all six phases. Hence, this
Table 5 PN simulation results
Phase Phase failures Phases started Phase
unreliability
Mission reliabil-
ity at phase end
Phase unreliability
(FT)
Mission reliabil-
ity at phase end
(FT)
1 18449 1000000000 0.00001845 0.999982 0.00001855 0.999981
2 244863 999981551 0.00024486 0.999737 0.00024386 0.999738
3 72843 999736688 0.00007286 0.999664 0.00007266 0.999665
4 218911 999663845 0.00021898 0.999445 0.00021915 0.999446
5 22488 999444934 0.00002250 0.999422 0.00002243 0.999423
6 125509 999422446 0.00012558 0.999297 0.00012527 0.999298
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Table 6 Phase failures during
600000 MFOP simulations Phase
Phase started Failures in Total failure Phase unreliability
Mission 1 Mission 2 . . . Mission 500
1 251755556 7 12 . . . 7 4667 0.00001854
2 251750889 162 138 . . . 101 61589 0.00024464
3 251689300 41 54 . . . 47 24193 0.00009612
4 251665107 115 132 . . . 82 55059 0.00021878
5 251610048 11 9 . . . 10 5654 0.00002247
6 251604394 69 75 . . . 66 31552 0.00012540
value also indicates the overall reliability of the AGV in
accomplishing the whole mission. This means that the AGV
has a greater than 99% chance of successfully completing
the mission. For this reason, it can be concluded that the
AGV considered here is a very reliable material distribution
vehicle in the warehouse. However these are results for only
one mission and it is expected that the AGV will perform
numerous missions and hence its reliability as the number of
missions increases is of interest. As can be seen from Table
5, the mission reliability at the end of each phase decreases
gradually against the number of phases that the AGV has
successfully completed. This suggests that without mainte-
nance, the more missions are completed, the more unreliable
the AGV system will be.
Hence, the PN model has been run to simulate the AGV
system performing a number of continuous consecutive
missions without maintenance. The results for 600000 indi-
vidual MFOP, each of them containing 500 consecutive
missions, are shown in Table 6, where the unreliability for
each phase is shown. The number of simulations, failures
and reliabilities for each mission and overall MFOP are
shown in Table 7. As can be seen, the reliability of the AGV
for completing the MFOP with 500 missions is 0.69547667.
Obviously, such a method is very helpful in determining the
Table 7 MFOP and mission failure results
MFOP/mission Starts Failures Reliability
Mission 1 600000 405 0.99932500
Mission 2 599595 420 0.99929953
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Mission 500 417599 313 0.99925048
MFOP 600000 182714 0.69547667
optimal inspection interval for performing the maintenance
of the AGV.
Following this logic, the reliability of the MFOPs with
different number of consecutive missions is calculated via
simulation. The simulation results are shown in Fig. 12,
from which it is clearly observed that the reliability of the
AGV is reduced with the increasing number of missions.
Accordingly, through observing such a decreasing tendency
of the reliability of the AGV against the number of missions,
the optimal inspection and maintenance time can be readily
estimated to ensure the reliability of the AGV can be above
a desired level.
The research documented in this paper demonstrates that
the PN method can be used for AGV reliability assessment.
It can easily be adapted to cater for varying complexities of
the subsystems and number of AGVs, where coloured Petri
nets can be used. In contrast to the fault tree approach, the
PN simulation method does not require finding a complex
qualitative solution. Hence, it is a promising time saving
and effective approach that can be widely used in the future
to deal with the reliability problems existing in complex
systems.
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Fig. 12 Reliability vs. mission number
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7 Conclusions
In order to develop an efficient and reliable approach to
assessing the reliability of AGVs, the PN method is adopted
in this paper to calculate the mission and phase reliability
of a typical AGV transport system. Due to the size of the
system considered and the mission profile, FTA was also
performed and the results compared with those obtained
using PN’s. Agreement was seen to be good. FTA is lim-
ited in its use for complex systems as dependencies cannot
be accurately modelled. It is also increasingly complex
and slow as the number of phases in a mission increases.
PNs have none of these limitations and hence can eas-
ily be extended to more complex systems and missions
with numerous phases. Through this research, the follow-
ing conclusions can be drawn: (1) the PN method has been
demonstrated to be an effective approach for conducting
AGV system mission reliability assessment providing the
capability to make informed decisions regarding the accept-
ability of AGV mission performance; (2) the results have
suggested that the AGV is more likely to fail when complet-
ing the phase ‘dispatch to station’ and the phase ‘travelling
to storage’. It is worthy to note that such a judgement is
made only based on the assumptions given in Tables 1
and 3. In reality, the judgement result would be different,
depending on the environmental, loading and operational
conditions of the AGVs. These are easily adapted within
the modelling approach thus enabling more complex AGV
systems to be modelled; (3) by using the PN method, the
influence of maintenance and the optimal time for main-
tenance can be evaluated. (4) The PN method is able to
account for dependencies which may occur within subsys-
tem and across mission phases enabling reliable capability
evaluations for AGV systems of the future with expanding
fleets.
It is worth mentioning that if the AGV system is rela-
tively simple with no dependencies and the mission does not
involve multiple tasks then FTA is applicable. However, if
any complexities are involved or maintenance needs to be
considered then, as shown here, combining the FTA with
PN simulation is an efficient approach.
Future work includes expanding the model to include
the routing problem once failure of an AGV occurs in a
multi-AGV system. The mission and route will be anal-
ysed simultaneously. Also, it is planned that the proposed
method will be validated in a real AGV system through the
collaboration with relevant industry partners.
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